the Amateur Aficionado

Posted in Philosophy & Politics | Tagged David Hume., Is/Ought Fallacy. | 3 Comments

3 Responses

1. on January 19, 2010 at 12:12 am George

   Chris,

   I appreciate your skills in logic (which are much more advanced than mine), but I remain unconvinced of your position on this issue. Here are four reasons why:

   1. Lack of Consensus
   I have a stubborn habit of treating my elders and the established authority with reverence and respect. In this situation, the “established authority” consists of men and women with PhDs and years of experience reading and writing about philosophy. However, just because well-educated people with impressive degrees think something, it doesn’t necessarily make it so. But it ought to give us pause.

   From what I can tell, the first person to state that an “ought” cannot logically succeed an “is” was David Hume in his Treatise of Human Nature. According to the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,

   Hume famously closes the section of the Treatise that argues against moral rationalism by observing that other systems of moral philosophy, proceeding in the ordinary way of reasoning, at some point make an unremarked transition from premises linked only by “is” to propositions linked by “ought” (expressing a new relation) — a deduction that seems to Hume “altogether inconceivable”.

   Observation #1: There are other systems of moral philosophy. Many men, as intelligent as, or more intelligent than Hume have apparently thought it OK to move from statement of fact to moral imperative.

   The Encyclopedia continues,

   Few passages in Hume’s work have generated more interpretive controversy.

   Some interpreters think Hume commits himself here to a non-propositional or noncognitivist view of moral judgment — the view that moral judgments do not state facts and are not truth-evaluable…Some see the paragraph as denying ethical realism, excluding values from the domain of facts. Other interpreters — the more cognitivist ones — see the paragraph about ‘is’ and ‘ought’ as doing none of the above.

   Some read it as simply providing further support for Hume’s extensive argument that moral properties are not discernible by demonstrative reason…Others interpret it as making a point about the original discovery of virtue and vice, which must involve the use of sentiment. On this view, one cannot make the initial discovery of moral properties by inference from nonmoral premises using reason alone; rather, one requires some input from sentiment. However, on this reading it is compatible with the is/ought paragraph that once a person has the moral concepts as the result of prior experience of the moral sentiments, he or she may reach moral conclusions by inference from causal, factual premises (stated in terms of ‘is’) about the effects of character traits on the sentiments of observers. They point out that Hume himself makes such inferences frequently in his writings.

   Observation #2: There is even disagreement over exactly what Hume is trying to say.

   Observation #3: Apparently, Hume himself would often draw “ought” conclusions from “is” statements.

   An article on the is-ought problem in Wikipedia (a questionable “established authority”) states:

   Many modern naturalistic philosophers see no impenetrable barrier in deriving “ought” from “is” believing an “ought” can derive from an “is” whenever we analyze goal-directed behavior, and a statement of the form “In order for A to achieve goal B, A ought to do C” exhibits no category error and may be factually verified or refuted.

   And it lists two modern philosophers who claim to have debunked the is/ought “fallacy”–John Rogers Searle, DPhil, Oxford and David Alan Johnson, PhD, Princeton.

   When the “established authority” is in agreement about something, it’s probably a safe bet to follow their lead (although not always). The main reason I accept germ theory is not because I have actually seen bacteria and viruses under a microscope, but rather, because every doctor and medical school professor accepts it. (I realize that this is a West-centric example, so please bear with me). Now if only half of all doctors and medical school professors believed in germ theory, then I would be in a quandary until I did some of my own research.

   I don’t know what the actual percentages are, but it’s clear that there is not a consensus within the authoritative philosophical community about the validity of Hume’s proposition. There is not even widespread agreement about what Hume was trying to say.

   2. The Idea of Worth/Value
   In The Scientific Determination of Value I presented the instance of a gemologist evaluating a diamond as an example of deriving an “is” from an “ought”. In reading your response, I see that I failed to define what I meant by “worth”. I did not mean market value. The “worth” I was thinking of might be described as a certain combination and quantity of attributes resulting in beauty, desirability, superiority, excellence, etc. True, it is a somewhat relative quality, but it has just enough objectivity to it that when any experienced gemologist sees it, he thinks to himself, “Ahhhh. Now that is a valuable diamond,” without any reflection upon its market value. It is the quality that art-lovers enjoy in Rembrandt; music-lovers in Bach; sports-lovers in Michael Jordan; science-lovers in Einstein; etc. Does it have market value? In most cases, yes. But this type of worth also transcends mere human opinion and the law of supply and demand.

   Perhaps this type of “worth” is a sort of “bridge” between “is” and “ought”. Because at the same time it is both indicative and imperative.

   This diamond is intrinsically beautiful, valuable, etc. and this diamond intrinsically demands that I treat it with care, with respect.

   To say, “The Mona Lisa is valuable,” is really to say two things at once:
   a. The Mona Lisa is of a certain quality (e.g., beautiful, excellent, sublime, etc.).
   b. The Mona Lisa ought to be esteemed (i.e., treasured, treated with respect, honored, etc.).

   In this case the “ought” is not derived from the “is”. The “ought” and the “is” are one in the same.

   3. Prudence
   The wisdom of man’s common sense seems to have no problem jumping from an “is” to an “ought”.

   A few examples:
   Water is valuable because the human body needs it to survive and it is useful for various things such as cooking, generating electricity, keeping a car from overheating, etc. Therefore we ought to conserve the earth’s water supply.

   Prolonged exposure to fire is dangerous, painful, and possibly deadly. Therefore you ought not sit in the campfire.

   God is more valuable than anything else in existence. Therefore we ought to esteem Him more than anything else in existence.

   It just seems unnecessary to add a third step in the middle of each of these equations.

   4. The Consequence of Nihilism
   Part of the reason I’m concerned about the alleged is/ought fallacy is out of sympathy for the unbeliever. Jews, Muslims, and Christians could easily accept Hume’s proposition, and not have to worry about creating a new moral system because they would still have God’s “arbirtrary” commandments to guide them. We also approach morality deontologically.

   But from an atheistic, and especially materialistic (can you be an atheist without being a materialist?), perspective there is only being. Only “is”. And if Hume is right, then we can derive no “oughts”. So on the one hand, we reject any imperatives that nature seems to offer, and on the other, we discount the supernatural, the existence of an omniscient, objective Source of moral standards. If there is no God and Hume was right, then Nietzsche was probably right: God has died, and we have progressed to a point beyond good and evil. We are drowning in the sea of nihilism.

   I know you have written about arriving at an ethic of love without the aid of God in your post, A Secular Imperative to Love. But if you accept Hume’s position, I don’t see how it’s possible without allowing for “leaps” from the indicative to the imperative. I guess I’ll just have to read it.

   Thanks for making me think really hard about some important topics!

   George

   
   
2. on January 19, 2010 at 12:36 am George

   Chris,

   It’s been a pleasure conversing with you. You’ve given me some good food for thought that I shall continue to process. Unfortunately, I’m going to have to bow out of this dialogue for now. Life has caught up with me. My responsibilities as a husband, father, friend, missionary/teacher, seminary student, etc., currently leave no room for the time and energy that this conversation deserves. I must be utilitarian for now and focus on writing things that will get me through seminary. :)

   Perhaps at some point in the future I’ll jump on your blog and throw in my two cents on your post, A Secular Imperative to Love. Feel free to continue commenting on these posts–I’m not concerned about having the last word. And if you’re ever back in Buenos Aires, let me know, and we can continue this conversation vis-a-vis over some cafe con leche or Quilmes Cristal.

   Best wishes,
   George

   
   
3. on January 23, 2010 at 11:27 am Chris Lawrence

   Thanks George.

   I completely understand your decision to put blogging on hold. You are right – it is amazing how it can make time disappear.

   So I’ll try to be as brief as possible. (I’m responding not because I’m desperate to have the last word, but because, like you, I find these questions so profoundly interesting.)

   Yes I’m aware there are counter-arguments claiming there are circumstances where an ought can be derived from an is. I remember the John Searle material but not David Alan Johnson.

   From memory Searle’s argument (or one of his arguments) was about promising: I promised to do x (is), therefore I ought to do x (ought).

   This for me is like an apparent exception which turns out to prove a rule. To promise is to place oneself under an obligation. So it’s a specific example of the more general: I placed myself under an obligation to do x (is), therefore I ought to do x (ought).

   I cannot see how this could be described as deriving an ought from an is. If I placed myself under an obligation and the obligation still holds, then I am under an obligation. ‘I am under an obligation to do x‘ is synonymous with ‘I ought to do x‘. It’s not deriving an ought from an is, it’s restating an ought.

   But there are no doubt other arguments which can’t be dealt with in this way.

   If I were to respond more fully, then I would probably focus on what you say in 4. The Consequence of Nihilism.

   You say: So on the one hand, we reject any imperatives that nature seems to offer, and on the other, we discount the supernatural, the existence of an omniscient, objective Source of moral standards.

   But these are not the only options. To be subject to an imperative we do not have to derive that imperative from something which is not ourselves. We can and do freely choose to subject ourselves to imperatives. This is open to the believer and non-believer alike. Nihilism itself is a choice which we are free to make or reject.

   The idea that nihilism is a consequence of the ‘death of God’ only makes sense in the context of theistic ethics.

   For me one of the fundamental flaws in theistic ethics is the unwarranted belief that free will is something God ‘gave us’ rather than being something we just have.

   Thanks again for the conversation – & the invite!

   Chris
   thinking makes it so